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Executive Summary  
South Asian Stability Workshop 2.0 was a crisis simulation tabletop exercise (TTX) held in 
Kuala Lumpur in February 2015. This tabletop exercise engaged top security experts and 
scholars from the United States, India, and Pakistan to explore dynamics revealed in a previous 
iteration of this workshop that demanded further testing. Examining the implications of strategic 
crisis emanating in South Asia, this exercise attempted to study the cascading effects of military 
crises and avenues for inadvertent escalation on air, sea, and land. Furthermore, this TTX 
explored shifting geopolitical tensions, trigger events that warrant military responses, escalation 
thresholds, and avenues for diffusion and de-escalation of the crisis.  
Background 
This project builds upon the findings from a previous PASCC-funded event, South Asian 
Stability Workshop 1.0 tabletop exercise (TTX) in Colombo, March 2013. This exercise, set in 
year 2018, simulated escalation dynamics resulting from a terrorist attack in India, traced to a 
Pakistani terrorist group. The Indian Team responded with a “limited” punitive operation against 
Pakistan, but despite India’s limited intent, the conflict rapidly escalated into a full-scale war 
over the course of nine in-game days. By the end of the exercise, Pakistan faced immense 
pressure for nuclear weapon deployment and possible employment. Both countries had no 
intention of getting into a full-scale war. However, neither team was able to terminate the war on 
its own terms and was prepared to fight through, including possible nuclear exchanges.  
Four key conclusions were drawn from the South Asian Stability Workshop 1.0 simulation, 
which illuminate the strategic dilemma between India and Pakistan and illustrate the difficulty of 
escalation control during a “limited war:”  
1. Entrenched threat perceptions on the subcontinent increase the likelihood of rapid 
reaction and use of force in the event of an acute crisis, such as a terror attack.  
2. India’s conventional force advantage incentivizes maximal employment of military 
forces in order to achieve a quick, impressive victory before international intervention 
forces a cessation of hostilities.  
3. Limited war for India is a full-scale war for Pakistan. Pakistan considers India’s growing 
conventional force advantage an existential threat and keeps “all options” open to defend 
itself.  
4. As a limited war escalates horizontally and vertically, pressure to lower the nuclear 
threshold is high. During this time, signaling resolve and showcasing nuclear capability 
could lead to inadvertent escalation and culminate in a nuclear exchange. War 
termination also becomes difficult, as neither side wants to back down and appear as a 
“nation of wimps.”  
Game Summary 
Set in year 2020, the Kuala Lumpur TTX simulated the escalation dynamics of a crisis resulting 
from the shootdown of a Pakistani maritime surveillance aircraft over the disputed territory of Sir 
Creek. This incident occurred against a backdrop of an increasingly tense relationship and a 
series of incidents, including terrorist attacks in both countries, over the previous five years. This 
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echoes the real world: endemic tensions are the basis for accumulation of grievances in India and 
Pakistan, which contributes to a tinderbox strategic environment in the region. Both states are 
adjusting to the ongoing systematic geopolitical shifts, regional tensions and domestic 
disturbances. This TTX was designed to extend the progressive deterioration of relations into a 
future crisis where a simulated scenario necessitated military responses. The exercise tested 
assumptions on escalation dominance; sought reactions and courses of action in the event of 
nuclear detonation; and solicited avenues for diffusion and de-escalation of the crisis.  
Findings and Conclusions 
In order to test the reliability of the SASW 1.0 findings, new players were invited and a different 
trigger event was developed for SASW 2.0.1 As the game unfolded, it became clear that the four 
conclusions drawn from the earlier TTX continued to hold true. In both simulations, India’s 
limited authorization for punitive action rapidly escalated into a full-scale war that neither side 
could de-escalate or terminate.  
Indeed, the SASW 2.0 TTX clearly revealed that military missions in both countries rapidly 
evolve from simple punitive strikes or limited retribution to full-fledged war. Despite limitations 
imposed by the control team in the political guidance—India was instructed to keep military 
operations below the perceived Pakistani nuclear threshold, while Pakistan was instructed to 
keep the nuclear threshold high—the momentum generated by military operations overwhelmed 
the political limitations. By the time war termination was sought, three out of the four declared 
Pakistani thresholds were certainly crossed.2  
Beyond the reinforcement of the first iteration’s findings, four additional conclusions were 
reached as a result of SASW 2.0:  
1. Home Alone Syndrome: When given some leeway for a punitive military campaign, 
Indian military planners are predisposed to use maximum force in the limited window for 
operations, and resist any political oversight for the duration. The authors term this 
“Home Alone Syndrome.”3 
2. Nuclear Signaling was Ineffective: Pakistan’s attempts to establish intra-war deterrence 
via threats of possible nuclear use were ineffective. What signaling attempts were made 
failed to induce caution in India.  
                                                
1 In the SASW 1.0 TTX, the trigger event involved a terrorist attack in India that was traced to a Pakistan-based 
terrorist group. India responded with “limited” punitive operation against Pakistan (aka Cold Start). In this iteration, 
ongoing terrorist attacks formed the contextual backdrop for the trigger event, which was the shootdown of a 
Pakistani P-3 Orion surveillance aircraft.  
2 In 2002, Pakistan declared that any of four criteria would be grounds for nuclear employment: spatial incursion; 
physical destruction; economic strangulation; and fomentation of domestic instability. While the actual thresholds 
were deliberately kept ambiguous, it was clear in this exercise that the level of destruction of air and naval assets 
combined with the imposition of economic hardship via naval blockade and the incursion of Indian land forces in 
the later stages of the conflict strongly suggests that the first three nuclear thresholds were crossed.  
3 “Home alone syndrome” describes the behavior of the Indian military when Indian political leadership gives the 
armed forces a period of time to conduct military operations as a punitive response to Pakistani provocation. 
Operating under the presumption that political oversight is absent for the duration, the Indian military engages in an 
inter-service competition to inflict the hardest hit against its nemesis.  
South Asian Stability Workshop 2.0  |  3 
 
 
3. Ambiguous Nuclear Thresholds Lack Credibility: Despite Pakistan’s so-called four 
red lines for nuclear use, the Pakistan Team did not threaten nuclear use when confronted 
with the dramatic degradation of their air force and navy. As the crisis deepened, 
Pakistan’s assertions regarding its willingness to use tactical nuclear weapons went 
unheeded.  
4. Non-Military Options and Political Solutions Remain Elusive: Neither side 
effectively incorporated diplomatic, economic, or informational elements into a 
comprehensive strategy. Both states lack strategies to terminate war. International 
intervention was the only avenue for de-escalation put forth. In attempting to reach war 
termination, it became clear that the two sides’ bargaining positions were mutually 
exclusive. When confronted with a nuclear detonation, neither side saw the non-military 
dimensions of the crisis; they were unable to articulate plans for consequence 
management, and both sides believed they would and could continue to fight. 
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Introduction and Game Overview 
South Asian Stability Workshop 2.0 was a crisis simulation tabletop exercise (TTX) held in 
Kuala Lumpur in February 2015. This tabletop exercise engaged top security experts and 
scholars from the United States, India, and Pakistan to explore dynamics revealed in a previous 
iteration of this workshop that demanded further testing. Examining the implications of strategic 
crisis emanating in South Asia, this exercise attempted to study the cascading effects of military 
crises and avenues for inadvertent escalation on air, sea, and land. Furthermore, this TTX 
explored shifting geopolitical tensions, trigger events that warrant military responses, escalation 
thresholds, and avenues for diffusion and de-escalation of the crisis.  
This project builds upon the findings from a previous PASCC-funded event, South Asian 
Stability Workshop 1.0 tabletop exercise (TTX) in Colombo, March 2013. This exercise, set in 
year 2018, simulated escalation dynamics resulting from a terrorist attack in India, traced to a 
Pakistani terrorist group. The Indian Team responded with a “limited” punitive operation against 
Pakistan, but despite India’s limited intent, the conflict rapidly escalated into a full-scale war 
over the course of nine in-game days. By the end of the exercise, Pakistan faced immense 
pressure for nuclear weapon deployment and possible employment. Both countries had no 
intention of getting into a full-scale war. However, neither team was able to terminate the war on 
its own terms and was prepared to fight through, including possible nuclear exchanges.  
Four key conclusions were drawn from the first South Asian Stability Workshop 1.0 simulation, 
which illuminate the strategic dilemma between India and Pakistan and illustrate the difficulty of 
escalation control during a “limited war:”  
1. Entrenched threat perceptions on the subcontinent increase the likelihood of rapid 
reaction and use of force in the event of an acute crisis, such as a terror attack.  
2. India’s conventional force advantage incentivizes maximal employment of military 
forces in order to achieve a quick, impressive victory before international intervention 
forces a cessation of hostilities.  
3. Limited war for India is a full-scale war for Pakistan. Pakistan considers India’s growing 
conventional force advantage an existential threat and keeps “all options” open to defend 
itself.  
4. As a limited war escalates horizontally and vertically, pressure to lower the nuclear 
threshold is high. During this time, signaling resolve and showcasing nuclear capability 
could lead to inadvertent escalation and culminate in a nuclear exchange. War 
termination also becomes difficult, as neither side wants to back down and appear as a 
“nation of wimps.”  
Set in year 2020, the Kuala Lumpur TTX simulated escalation dynamics of a crisis resulting 
from the shootdown of a Pakistani maritime surveillance aircraft over the disputed territory of Sir 
Creek. This incident occurred against a backdrop of an increasingly tense relationship and a 
series of incidents, including terrorist attacks in both countries, over the previous five years. This 
echoes the real world: endemic tensions are the basis for accumulation of grievances in India and 
Pakistan, which contributes to a tinderbox strategic environment in the region. Both states are 
adjusting to the ongoing systematic geopolitical shifts, regional tensions and domestic 
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disturbances. This TTX was designed to extend the progressive deterioration of relations into a 
future crisis where a simulated scenario necessitated military responses. The exercise tested 
assumptions on escalation dominance; sought reactions and course of actions in the event of 
nuclear detonation; and solicited avenues for diffusion and de-escalation of the crisis.  
Objectives 
1. Seek practical and conceptual clarity to reinforce our theoretical understanding of 
strategic stability in South Asia. 
2. Understand the implications of current and evolving doctrines, the impact of 
technological maturation, and the intersection of the two drivers. 
3. Study the cascading effects of military crises and escalation between India and Pakistan. 
4. Explore avenues and mechanisms for de-escalation. 
Participants 
The Indian and Pakistani teams were composed of eight participants from each country 
representing the diplomatic, academic, and military communities. Some of the participants had 
participated in the previous SASW 1.0 exercise held in Colombo, Sri Lanka in March 2013, but 
many participants were new to the experience. While the previous exercise included mostly 
retired military participants, this exercise sought to diversify the teams with a mix of military and 
civilian members representing different generations.  
Background India Team Pakistan Team 
Army 
Lieutenant General 
Indian Army, Ret. 
Lieutenant General 
Pakistan Army, Ret. 
Brigadier General 
Indian Army, Ret. 
Brigadier General 
Pakistan Army, Ret. 
Navy 
Rear Admiral 
Indian Navy, Ret. 
Vice Admiral 
Pakistan Navy, Ret. 
Air Force 
Air Vice Marshal 
Indian Air Force, Ret. 
Air Commodore 
Pakistan Air Force, Ret. 
Diplomats 
Ambassador 
Indian MEA, Ret.  
Ambassador 
Pakistan MFA, Ret.  
Academics 
Center For Air Power Studies  
New Delhi, India 
Quaid-i-Azam University 
Islamabad, Pakistan 




National Maritime Foundation 
New Delhi, India 
Quaid-i-Azam University 
Islamabad, Pakistan 




The tabletop exercise consisted of two 
opposing Country Teams using the full 
instruments of national power to achieve a 
favorable resolution of a future crisis situation. 
A third team, the Control Team, represented 
the National Command Authority for both 
teams, enforced game rules, and adjudicated 
game play.  
Beginning with the pre-game briefings, game 
play consisted of campaign planning, moves 
one through four, and two vignette 
discussions. Following each move, the 
Country Teams briefed their plans separately 
to control. Control then adjudicated the move 
in a closed session and briefed the players on 
the results in an open session. Each Country 
Team then conducted their planning for the 
next move, and the cycle repeated for moves 
one through three. For move four, the Country 
Teams and Control conducted “open 
adjudication” in which the players briefed their moves in an open session and all three teams 
discussed the results together. After move four, Control facilitated two vignette discussions.  
Game Rules 
The following rules remained in effect throughout game play: -­‐ Chatham House Rules governs game play. All comments were treated as “not for 
attribution.” Participants were advised that the results of game play could be discussed or 
published but not in such a way as to be attributable to any specific player. No recording 
or photography was allowed.  -­‐ Control maintains final decision-making authority. The outcome of each move is not 
biased, scripted, or pre-determined in any way, but players should accept the game 
narrative and the results of Control adjudication as much as possible. In addition to its 
adjudication responsibility, Control represents the political authority of both Country 
Teams.  -­‐ Control Team has global access. Control members were allowed to enter the planning 
rooms at any time to ask questions or to observe decision-making dynamics. -­‐ Country Teams have limited access. Country teams were not allowed to enter the 
planning rooms of the opposing team or the Control Team unless invited. Both Country 
Teams were assigned their own planning rooms as well as representatives from the 
Control Team to provide guidance and facilitate game play. 
 
Figure 1: Game flow overview 
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Game Materials  
Two weeks prior to the exercise, Control distributed copies of the Scenario Brief and the Order 
of Battle (ORBAT) to the players so that they could review both strategic setting and tactical 
capabilities available to them in the 2020 scenario. On day one of game play, Control reviewed 
the game rules, scenario, and order of battle and presented the players with the trigger event that 
would initiate their crisis planning. In separate briefings, Control issued NCA guidance to both 
teams as a source of planning parameters and strategic objectives to facilitate campaign planning. 
Game Materials   







Security environment of 2020 based on present trends and future 
hypotheticals. Includes global, regional, and domestic settings for 








Detailed listing of military forces of the participant countries in the 
2020 environment at BDE/SQDN/Combatant level and above. 
Based on open source resources including Jane’s Defense Weekly. 




















List of purpose, method, end state, planning considerations, and 
strategic objectives for each team. Each team received similar NCA 
guidance to punish the other team in order to deter future 
aggressive actions. 
Campaign Planning 
After receiving the trigger event and NCA guidance, each Country Team prepared a campaign 
plan to achieve the end state and strategic objectives set by their NCA (see Appendix C). The 
campaign plan template required the players to identify supporting objectives using the levers of 
national power defined by the acronym DIME: diplomatic, informational, military, and 
economic. For example, for a given “Strategic Objective X,” the players were tasked with 
identifying sub-objectives across the DIME spectrum. Additionally, each team prepared a 
reaction hypothesis of the “high/low” response for the opposite team, “high” being the most 
dangerous or maximal response and “low” being the most likely or minimal response. Following 
campaign planning, the Country Teams briefed their concepts to control separately. 
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Move Planning and Adjudication 
For each of the four moves, the players planned their actions across the DIME spectrum for the 
next 72 hours. Control asked players to complete nine move sheets in which they defined the 
who, what, when, where, and how for each action. The diplomatic, information, and economic 
aspects had one move sheet each, while the military portion included four move sheets: Army, 
Navy, Air Force, and Strategic Forces. Control also provided the players with laminated maps of 
India and Pakistan in order to allow them to sketch actions when appropriate.  
Each team briefed the Control Team separately. The Control Team then reviewed each team’s 
completed move templates and identified when to end the move in game time. While each team 
planned actions for 72 hours, Control typically stopped game time within 48 hours in order to 
allow the teams to initiate a new decision cycle in response to a critical action by one of the 
teams. Move 4 was adjudicated in an open discussion with both Country Teams present. 
Similarly, the vignette results were briefed in an open plenary session. The campaign plans were 
not adjudicated; rather, they were expected to serve as a roadmap for the teams as the crisis 
unfolded. 
Cyber Play and Adjudication 
To provide players with another method of 
achieving their objectives, Control integrated 
offensive and defensive cyber actions into the 
game play in order to better understand player 
perceptions on priorities, risks, and potential 
rewards.  
For each move, the teams were given five 
offensive and five defensive “cyber points” to 
distribute among eight categories, with no more 
than three points allocated to any category per 
move. The categories were manufacturing control 
systems, energy infrastructure, finance 
infrastructure, telecom infrastructure, 
transportation infrastructure, water infrastructure, 
military C2 (conventional), and strategic C2 
(nuclear). For any offensive cyber action, the 
teams identified the desired effect on the 
adversary’s systems as well as timing, attribution 
(whether overt or covert), and escalation 
concerns. Defensive actions did not require 
additional elaboration.  
Figure 2 – Sample cyber move sheets. The text on the 
move sheets is for demonstration purposes only and 
does not reflect any specific team moves. 
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Geopolitical Setting: 2015 to 2020  
By 2020, technological and doctrinal modernizations have begun to affect the tenuous nuclear 
stability in South Asia. The pursuit of different nuclear technologies has driven security concerns 
and internal balancing through a growing arms race between India and Pakistan. Moreover, both 
nations are advocating for so-called fourth generation warfare, implying that even in the absence 
of open conflict, India and Pakistan will continue to target each other through proxies and in the 
cyber, diplomatic, economic, and information domains. Non-state actors remain an acute 
problem throughout the subcontinent. Overall, the likelihood has increased for a sudden crisis 
between Pakistan and India to rapidly escalate due to accumulated grievances and renewed 
allegations over several issues: geopolitical tensions, Kashmir antagonisms, and a maritime build 
up.  
Global Context 
The U.S. rebalance to Asia remains highly visible in 2020 with robust political, economic, and 
military coordination between the United States and India, Japan, Australia, and the nations of 
Southeast Asia. The global economy is stable, but India and China are experiencing slowdowns. 
The United States desires cooperative engagement with China, but the pivot is aggravating 
Beijing’s strategic anxieties, and Beijing continues to increase its military spending. Two 
regional hotspots are drawing international attention: Ukraine and the Spratly Islands. Russia has 
consolidated its control of the Crimea, and separatist movements continue to plague Ukraine. In 
the South China Sea, China has renewed its claims to the Spratly Islands in the face of increasing 
resistance from regional players. At present, world powers and institutions are not actively 
focused on conflict resolution in South Asia.  
U.S. policy seeks to maintain stability in Asia in order to ensure 
uninterrupted trade flows. To this end, the United States is working to 
combat regional extremist forces, prevent nuclear proliferation, and 
engage in cooperative interaction with China without allowing for 
territorial revisionism. The U.S. has diminished its Afghan footprint to 
approximately 5,000 troops focused on counterterrorism and Afghan 
military training but infrastructure remains for a rapid force buildup in the event of a crisis. The 
U.S.-India strategic relationship remains important for the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific 
region. The United States has expanded cooperation with India to include joint initiatives to 
secure the Indian Ocean’s sea lanes as well as eased export controls for civil nuclear 
components. The U.S. continues to pressure Pakistan to eliminate anti-India elements on 
Pakistani territory. The U.S.-Pakistan defense relationship has diminished as Pakistan’s supply 
routes are less critical for resupply of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, but military engagement and 
cooperation continues on counterterrorism. Pakistan plays a significant role in CTF-151 
operating in the Gulf of Aden, and SOF and joint military exercises continue. While the U.S. and 
Pakistan have no nuclear deal comparable to the U.S. deal with India, the United States has 
ignored growing Sino-Pakistani energy cooperation.  
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Despite slowing GDP growth, China has increased defense spending to 
counter U.S. efforts at “containment,” respond to India’s forward 
deployment in Arunachal Pradesh, and address unrest in Tibet and 
Xinjiang. China believes that the U.S. pivot has encouraged regional 
players to intensify their claims in the South China Sea, and multiple 
Chinese dam sites on the upper Brahmaputra River are elevating 
tensions with India. At home, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement is on the rise in Xinjiang, 
and a new and more vocal Dalai Lama seems to be contributing to demonstrations in Tibet. 
China has significantly developed its west and southwest military regions, deploying troops to 
Tiber and Xinjiang to quell the unrest. Technologically, China has operationalized its fifth-
generation J-20 fighter, developed new missiles and nuclear delivery systems (including a sea-
based deterrent), and added a second aircraft carrier to its fleet, though these carriers have not yet 
deployed to the Indian Ocean region. China has increased its cooperation with Pakistan, 
expanding the Pakistan-China (Karakoram) highway, staging military exercises, and conducting 
regular port calls. 
Regional Context 
The persistent hostility surrounding India and Pakistan’s foray into the nuclear age has spurred 
an ever-rising level of regional violence. In an effort to establish stability on their own terms, 
senior political and military leaders from both India and Pakistan have called for more proactive 
methods of responding to perceived provocations and have adopted “offensive-defense” policies 
designed to execute preemptive strikes against potential threats. These policies have led to an 
expansion of covert fourth generation warfare. Rather than face the nuclear consequences of 
direct conventional engagement, each side has turned to its respective methods of punishing the 
other: proxy conflict, cyber and economic warfare, and diplomatic isolation. India and Pakistan 
openly allege that the other’s intelligence agencies are conducting covert operations through their 
respective proxies. At the same time, both countries have honed their military doctrines for speed 
and lethality, and nationalist rhetoric is on the rise.  
India continues to be concerned about China, Pakistan, and Sino-
Pakistani cooperation. The rivalry between India and China has shifted 
to the maritime realm to control sea lanes, despite growing trade 
between the two countries. India is concerned about China’s large 
military presence along its disputed borders and complains that Chinese 
dams on the Brahmaputra River have lowered water levels in Arunachal 
Pradesh. India views Pakistani military policy as a part of China’s broader defense strategy and 
notes the military implications of the Pakistan-China (Karakoram) highway from Xinjiang to 
Gwadar. India also complains that Pakistan uses sub-conventional actors as proxies to fight an 
asymmetric war with India. Kashmir and the Sir Creek dispute remain open sores in relations 
between the two nations. The current Indian PM has promised to integrate Kashmir, enforce 
India’s borders, ensure maritime security, and build economic and military partnerships that 
fortify India’s growing position in the world order.  
The Indian military has continued to modernize and advance new doctrinal concepts. The Indian 
Army has four IBGs that can mobilize and respond within 24 hours. The Indian strike corps can 
reach battle areas within 96-120 hours. Air bases along the Pakistani border remain activated in 
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anticipation of any sudden contingencies. At sea, the Indian Navy is able to project power in the 
Asia-Pacific region. India’s nuclear forces remain in de-alert status, but SOPs are in place to alert 
and operationalize these forces on short notice.  
In foreign relations, Pakistan has increased cooperation with China while 
maintaining a neutral relationship with Afghanistan. China and Pakistan 
have been conducting joint military exercises in northern Pakistan and 
Xinjiang, and China has invested heavily in Pakistan’s transportation and 
communications sectors to support the Gwadar Port, managed by a 
Chinese firm primarily as an oil port. The Chinese navy makes at least two 
port calls per year at Gwadar. Military-to-military relations vis-à-vis Afghanistan have improved 
but the border dispute along the Durand Line remains unresolved. Pakistan worries that the 
Afghan military orientation toward its southeastern areas has implications beyond 
counterinsurgency operations.  
Poor governance and internal security have hampered economic growth in Pakistan. As attempts 
to improve political relations with India have failed, the new government has reached out to 
China and Saudi Arabia for economic development. The TTP and other extremist groups remain 
the biggest obstacles to regional peace and domestic stability. Meanwhile, the Baluchi 
insurgency and other sectarian violence continue with the alleged encouragement of India via 
Afghanistan. The Pakistani military continues to be engaged in COIN operations in FATA and 
Baluchistan while remaining vigilant against India. Pakistan has reinforced garrisons with 
counter-IBG brigades located opposite of Indian IBGs, and the Pakistan Air Force remains in a 
high state of readiness in anticipation of any sudden strike from the IAF. At sea, Pakistan’s 
SLCM Agosta-class submarine regularly conducts deterrent patrols. Pakistan’s nuclear forces 
remain in de-alert status, but SOPs have been developed to integrate these forces with 
conventional forces on the battlefield.  
In the wake of reduced U.S. support and despite frequent crises with 
warlords and the Taliban, Afghanistan has pursued a neutral foreign policy 
direction that seeks a balance of favor from neighbors and strategic 
partners, including China and Saudi Arabia. In response to the Afghan 
strategic balancing act, both Indian and Pakistani intelligence agencies 
retain pockets of support within Afghanistan to influence Afghan 
developments to their advantage. Afghan politics continue to be in flux as the country determines 
its future without a robust U.S. backstop. The Afghan military stands at approximately 175 
thousand troops. The Afghan Air Force has a negligible offensive capability, focusing mostly on 
air support to domestic counter-terror operations. 
  
South Asian Stability Workshop 2.0  |  12 
 
 
Timeline of Events: 2015—2020
2015: Resentment builds  
- Summer: Kashmiri separatist violence 
leads to LoC exchanges.  
2016: Major military exercises  
-­‐ Spring: The Indian Army launches huge 
military exercise in Rajasthan desert, 
dubbed “Brasstacks II”4 by the 
Pakistani media. 
-­‐ Summer: LoC incidents on the rise – 
Indian troops allege major Pak 
infiltration across LoC.  
-­‐ Fall: Pakistan Army exercise in Sindh 
simulates the integration of tactical 
nuclear weapons with conventional 
forces. The Indian media labeled this 
exercise “Zarb-i-Momin II.”5 
2017: China asserts itself over Spratlys  
-­‐ Spring: New US president reaffirms the 
Pacific Pivot, promising to strengthen 
ties with India.  
-­‐ Late spring: China begins periodically 
challenging commercial shipping 
traveling through the South China Sea. 
-­‐ Summer: U.S.-India naval exercise tests 
India’s maritime domain awareness 
(MDA) capabilities. India begins to 
confront Pakistani fisherman, alleging 
possible terror attacks.  
-­‐ Summer: Continued Kashmiri 
insurgency draws larger numbers of 
Indian troops.  
 
                                                
4 In 1986-7, India launched the Operation Brasstacks in 
Rajastan. Ostensibly a training exercise, Brasstacks 
nonetheless set off a crisis with Pakistan as the latter 
feared that the operation posed a threat to its security.  
5 In 1989, Pakistan responded to Brasstacks by launching 
its own large-scale training exercise, Operation Zarb-e-
Momin. Exercises by this name continue to the present 
day.  
2018: Increased Sino-Pakistani cooperation 
-­‐ Spring: Sino-Pakistani joint maritime 
exercise showcased anti-piracy and 
MDA capabilities.  
-­‐ Spring: New Pakistani PM pledges 
cooperation with China and Saudi 
Arabia and no compromise on core 
issues (i.e., Kashmir and nuclear 
weapons).  
-­‐ Summer: Sino-Pakistani 
counterterrorism operations against 
Uighurs. India places its forces in 
Jammu and Kashmir on high alert.  
-­‐ Fall: The new (15th) Dalai Lama 
supports greater Tibetan autonomy, 
bringing widespread revolt and more 
Chinese troops. 
-­‐ Fall: Indian election rhetoric calls for a 
hardline approach towards Kashmiri 
separatists, prompting LoC exchanges.  
2019: Indo-Pakistani maritime tension  
-­‐ Spring: Pakistan takes leadership of 
CTF-151. India reserves the right to 
carry out its own anti-piracy operations 
independent of the CTF.  
-­‐ Spring: Indian PM calls for increased 
resistance to Sino-Pakistani collusion, 
repeal of Article 370,6 and swift 
response to any Pakistani provocation.  
-­‐ Summer: Chinese port calls at Pak 
ports.  
-­‐ Fall: Pakistan sinks Indian fishing boat 
allegedly carrying supplies to terrorists. 
India places its navy on high alert. 
                                                
6 Passed in 1952, Article 370 governs the inclusion of 
the State of Jammu and Kashmir into the Indian union. 
The Article contains special provisions that preserve 
some degree of Kashmiri autonomy. For the complete 
text, see http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india 
/states/jandk/documents/actsandordinances/article 
370constitutionindia.htm. 
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2020: Relations become severely 
strained…  
-­‐ March: Indian attempts to modify 
Article 370 bring protests in Jammu and 
Kashmir, forcing India to deploy more 
troops to restore order. During the 
protests, a Muslim woman from 
Baramulla accused an Indian soldier of 
rape. Widespread rioting and elevated 
border tensions follow the accusation; 
India alleges Pakistani involvement.  
-­‐ April: Pakistan expresses concerns 
when Afghan military forces moved to 
the border areas, ostensibly to meet a 
local Taliban threat. Islamabad alleges 
an Indian hand. 
-­‐ May: Baluchi insurgents attack the 
Pakistan Navy base at Ormara, causing 
minor damage to the P-3 Orion aircraft 
and support facilities on the base. ISPR 
announces that the insurgents were 
acting on behalf of Indian agents 
operating in Kandahar. India angrily 
dismisses these allegations.  
-­‐ May: The Indian investigation of the 
Baramulla rape case determines that the 
charge was baseless, but protestors call 
for justice. Extremist organizations in 
Pakistan promised to defend “our 
sisters in Kashmir.” The issue polarizes 
Indian politics, with Hindu parties 
accusing Muslim groups of being Pak 
proxies.  
-­‐ May: Militants ambush Indian troops 
and raid ammunition dumps in 
Kashmir. India alleges that these attacks 
were carried out by Hizb’ul-mujahideen 
who claimed to have taken revenge for 
the alleged Baramulla rape victim.  
-­‐ June: Pakistani air defenses shoot down 
an Indian surveillance UAV over the 
Neelum Valley near a Chinese-
constructed hydroelectric plant. ISPR 
warns India against future violations; 
India maintains that the aircraft was 
actively pursuing terrorists.  
-­‐ July: Chinese ships arrive at Gwadar in 
preparation for a future naval exercise. 
-­‐ Early August: Communal violence in 
Muslim areas of Mumbai results in 
looting and several deaths. Mumbai 
police accuse Dawood Ibrahim of 
masterminding the attacks from Karachi 
with connivance of Pakistani 
intelligence. India demands extradition 
but Pakistan dismisses the allegation as 
baseless.  
-­‐ Mid-August: Pakistan reports that an 
Indian fighter jet engaged a Pakistan P-
3 Orion aircraft operating over the 
Rann of Kutch/Sir Creek. The aircraft 
safely returned, but the incident 
provokes media and political outrage. 
India warns Pakistan not to violate 
Indian airspace or face consequences; 
Pakistan denied that the aircraft crossed 
the border.  
-­‐ Late August: India sinks a large 
Pakistani fishing vessel that allegedly 
crossed into Indian waters. India claims 
that the boat was ferrying terrorists with 
links to Pakistani intelligence and 
subsequently releases photos of a 
weapons cache found among the 
wreckage. Pakistan vociferously denies 
the allegations, claiming that Indian 
intelligence planted the weapons among 
the dead bodies of simple fishermen. 
An Indo-Pakistani “media war” erupts 
amid intense political debate.  
-­‐ September: Border tensions continue in 
Kashmir and maritime zones (Sir 
Creek/North Arabian Sea)
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Game Play: Plans, Events, and Outcomes 
As noted earlier, game play consisted of campaign planning, four moves, and two vignettes. 
After presenting the trigger event, Control provided each team with National Command 
Authority guidance that asked them to craft a response to “punish” the opposite team for the 
string of incidents established in the scenario brief that had culminated in the P-3 border 
violation (India) / P-3 shootdown (Pakistan). Participants were asked to create both a campaign 
plan, delineating their desired end state and how they intended to achieve it, as well as their 
initial Move 1 plan for actions that would occur in the 72 hours following the trigger. 
Appendices B and C provide both the NCA guidance as well as the teams’ campaign plans. 
Moves 1-4 span September 6th through 11th 2020 and are presented here as a narrative occurring 
in real time. These narratives incorporate each side’s actions as well as Control’s adjudication of 
the interactions. Control adjudicated Moves 1-3 in a closed session, while Move 4 was 
adjudicated in an open plenary session with debate between the two teams. Following the four 
moves, Control asked both teams to consider responses in the event of 1) an accidental 
detonation of a Pakistani nuclear weapon, and 2) an NCA decision to seek war termination.  
Trigger Event and Guidance: September 7, 2020 
On the first day of game play, Control briefed the teams on a crisis that was to serve as the 
trigger event for their campaign planning and subsequent game moves:  
At 1800hrs on Sunday, September 6th, 2020, the IAF shot down a Pakistani P-3 Orion on a 
surveillance mission over Sir Creek [Rann of Kutch region]. It is unclear whether the plane 
violated Indian airspace, but fishermen found debris of the plane in the disputed area of the Sir 
Creek region. Pakistan reports that the crew was killed. The IAF claims that the plane intruded 
into Indian territory and did not heed warnings to return to Pakistani territory. The Pakistani 
Inter-Service Public Relations (ISPR) alleges that this incident was a deliberate attack on a 
defenseless plane conducting a routine mission—within Pakistani territorial airspace—and that 
this incident constitutes the latest Indian attempt to blind Pakistan’s “eyes and ears.” Pakistan’s 
Foreign Office spokeswoman affirms Pakistan’s right to self-defense and announces that the 
Pakistani National Command Authority has convened an emergency meeting.  
Rationale for Trigger 
Terrorist attacks in India triggered Indo-Pak crises in 2001 and 2008 as such terrorism has 
typically served as the trigger event for previous South Asian crisis escalation exercises. 
Nonetheless, previous exercises and real world events suggest that crisis escalation in South Asia 
results as much from cumulative perceptions and a desire to inflict retribution for previous 
wrongs as from a calculated response to a specific event. In addition, India generally perceives 
Sino-Pakistani collusion as working against India interests. In the Pakistani threat perception, 
India is a constant existential military threat and belief persists that India will find an excuse to 
wage war with Pakistan. In this case, Pakistanis were building up perceptions that India was 
covertly engaged in a blinding campaign to systematically destroy Pakistani ISR capabilities. In 
general, both nations harken back to grievances accumulated since partition in 1947. This 
exercise sought to test whether a different trigger would incite a different response.  
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This trigger event recreated an actual event that occurred in the wake of the Kargil conflict. On 
August 10th, 1999, IAF fighters from Naliya Air Base shot down a Pakistani Atlantique 
surveillance aircraft in the Rann of Kutch region, a disputed area.7 The incident contributed to 
the already tense environment and resulted in heightened alert levels but did not escalate toward 
a military confrontation at the time.  
For the projected 2020 environment, however, this type of incident offered four advantages for 
analysis as compared to a terrorist attack. First, the players were unlikely to expect such an 
event, given the focus on terrorism in the international media and in policy and academic circles. 
Second, the incident was a clearly attributable military event that aligned more closely with 
traditional military planning scenarios and concepts, and could thus be used to test standing 
doctrine rather than emergent strategies. Third, the proximity to the Arabian Sea and Indian 
Ocean Region created a naval dimension to the crisis. Finally, the incident switched the 
antagonist-protagonist roles. Rather than have India respond to an allegedly Pakistan-sponsored 
terror attack, this incident put Pakistan in the position of retaliating against an overt Indian 
military action. 
Campaign Plans 
Each team received unique but similar guidance from their respective NCAs in separate briefings 
by Control. The Indian and Pakistani NCAs asked their planners to “employ diplomatic, 
information, military, and economic elements of national power in a decisive, coordinated and 
supporting fashion” to punish the other team for long-term grievances and deter such actions in 
the future. For India, the primary grievance remained terrorism, and for Pakistan, the primary 
grievance was the “negative effects of India’s blinding campaign” against Pakistan. The Indian 
and Pakistani Teams were tasked to avoid nuclear or conventional war and “deter opportunism” 
from China and Afghanistan respectively.  
Acting as the Indian and Pakistani NCAs, Control issued additional guidance during Move 3 and 
Move 4 planning. During Move 3 planning, Control tasked the teams with transitioning to war 
termination, and Control informed the Indian Team that their NCA had denied the plan to 
conduct a cross-international border offensive into Pakistan during Move 2. During Move 4 
planning, Control informed the Indian Team that their NCA would approve a cross-border 
operation provided that it “contribute to meeting our strategic objectives,” including war 
termination.  
The Indian Team predicted that Pakistan would react to the destruction of its maritime patrol 
aircraft in one of three ways. Pakistan’s maximal response would be to attack naval assets and 
facilities in the vicinity of the Sir Creek area. At a minimum, Pakistan would limit its response to 
the LoC or use the “asymmetric option,” meaning some form of terror attack. In the meantime, 
India would implement a diplomatic, informational, and economic campaign to isolate Pakistan, 
explain India’s reaction as purely defensive in nature, and characterize the Pakistani border 
violation as part and parcel to Pakistan’s long-term campaign against India, including the 
                                                
7 For contemporary coverage of the August 10th, 1999 shoot-down, see the following news articles from The 
Independent and BBC News: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/16-dead-as-india-shoots-down 
-pakistani-naval-plane-1112052.html; http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/416233.stm.  
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“persistent terror problem.” To deter and respond to Pakistan’s retaliation, India would prepare 
its military for future action and “adopt an offensive posture against Pakistan.” 
The Pakistan Team planned to “conduct a befitting military response” and adopt a strong 
defensive posture to deter or defend against an Indian counterattack. On the diplomatic and 
information fronts, Pakistan would support this attack by “portraying India as the aggressor,” 
explaining Pakistan’s need to respond, and requesting that the international community “use its 
influence to limit escalation.” Additionally, Pakistan would take measures to “safeguard against 
shocks to our economy.”  
The Pakistan Team expected that India would “respond in kind” to any Pakistani retaliatory 
action because India believed that it was within its rights to shoot down the Pakistani P-3 Orion 
that had, in India’s assessment, violated the border. The Pakistan Team anticipated two possible 
Indian responses to a retaliatory attack. At a minimum, India would conduct a limited “tit-for-
tat” response, mobilize its pivot corps, and otherwise dismiss Pakistani diplomatic and 
informational campaign. As a maximal response, however, India would actively contest 
Pakistan’s diplomatic and informational initiatives with a diplomatic offensive and “media blitz” 
that “portray Pakistan as aggressive following the retaliatory strike.” India would also attack 
multiple Pakistani military targets, take action along the LoC, announce a naval blockade, and 
mobilize its IBGs as well as pivot corps. The Pakistan Team chose to strike Naliya Airbase in an 
effort to limit escalation to the Indian low option by targeting only the base from which the 
Indian air attack came.  
Move 1 – Trigger Event (T) to T+29 hours 
Sunday, September 6 (1800hrs) to Monday, September 7, 2020 (2100hrs) 
Immediately following the convening of the 
Pakistani NCA, the Pakistani Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA) releases a statement 
condemning Indian aggression and declaring 
Pakistan’s right to respond “appropriately and 
effectively.” The Pakistan government also 
directs all its agencies to take stock of critical 
materials in light of the current situation. The 
media in both countries quickly jump to cover 
the crisis. The Indian media cites the border 
violation as the latest in Pakistan’s “pattern of 
aggressive intent and provocation” against India 
over the past five years. Pakistani media outlets 
begin 24/7 coverage, describing the Indian 
shootdown as “unprovoked” and speculating 
about the possibility of escalation to all-out war. 
Pakistan activates the DGMO hotline, seeking 
clarification on the P-3 incident. Both sides 
reiterate their interpretation of events but agree 
to remain in contact. 
Figure 3 – Move 1 Military Actions. India shoots down 
Pakistani P-3 Orion. Pak Navy increases patrolling in EEZ. 
India initiates LoC firefights. Pakistan attacks Naliya air 
base.  
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Summary of Move 1 Military Actions  
Sun, 6 Sept (1800hrs) to Mon, 7 Sept (2100hrs)  
1800, 6 Sept – trigger event: Indian aircraft from 
Naliya Air Base shoots down PK P-3 Orion over Sir 
Creek area 
2100, 6 Sept – game starts: Indian and Pakistani 
NCA convene to determine appropriate response 
Beginning AM, 7 Sept: Indian Army increases firing 
across LoC 
Beginning AM, 7 Sept: Pak Navy patrolling EEZ 
and enforcing territorial waters 
1800, 7 Sept: Pak Air Force raids Naliya Air Base 
• Indian losses include: (3) Su-30s, (1) 
Hanger, (1) C2 Node, (1) SAM site struck 
• Pak losses include: (3) JF-17; (1) damaged; 
(1) crashed in Pak territory (pilot ejected); 
(1) crashed in Indian territory (pilot status 
unknown) 
During the early morning hours of September 7th, India and Pakistan place their militaries on 
high alert and ready their forces for contingencies. Along the Indo-Pakistani border, land forces 
prepare defensive positions while air units activate their forward operating bases and increase 
activity all along the Indo-Pakistani border. India mobilizes its IBGs and rebalances its air forces 
westward while also increasing surveillance in the eastern and northeastern sectors. Both 
countries initiate pre-deployment activity in naval ports. The Pakistan Navy announces the recall 
of all forces attached to CTF-151 and increases patrolling within Pakistan’s EEZ. By mid-day, 
firing breaks out along the LoC as Indian forces conduct aggressive patrolling supported by 
mortar fire and heavy machine guns.  
Across the globe, diplomats from India and Pakistan explain their countries’ respective positions 
on the P-3 incident. From India’s perspective, Pakistan violated the 1991 CBM under which no 
military were allowed within 10km of the border, and the incident constitutes just the latest 
example of Pakistan’s pattern of aggression. In the Pakistani view, India ruthlessly shot down an 
unarmed surveillance aircraft operating legally within Pakistani territory, and Pakistan reserves 
the right to respond appropriately. Both countries deliver public warnings to their opposite’s 
ambassador and dispatch special emissaries to the P5 nations (the United States, United 
Kingdom, France, Russia, and China). Pakistan sends an emissary to Afghanistan while India 
sends emissaries to Germany, Iran, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia.  
Government spokesmen from the United States and China weigh in on the growing crisis. The 
US spokesman expresses concern and condemns the recent spate of terrorist attacks and violence 
in the region, saying that India and Pakistan need to resolve their disputes peacefully. A Chinese 
spokesman indicates that China values peace 
and calm in regions near international shipping 
routes and calls on India to cease its 
aggressive actions that could result in further 
escalation. 
Both India and Pakistan request action from 
international institutions. At the UN, 
Pakistan’s ambassador calls for an emergency 
meeting of the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) to condemn India’s actions, 
while his Indian counterpart consults with 
American, British, and French 
representatives. The UNSC convenes in the 
late afternoon and receives briefings from the 
Pakistani and Indian ambassadors, but the 
meeting adjourns without a statement. 
Meanwhile, Indian intelligence officials call a 
meeting with the station heads of SAARC 
countries, presenting them with dossiers 
outlining Pakistani financial support to 
terrorism in violation of SAARC protocol. 
Times of India cites an anonymous source 
saying that India demanded “prompt action” 
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against Pakistan. Additionally, India announces its intention to file a petition at the International 
Court of Justice regarding Pakistan’s violation of India’s Air Defense Identification Zone. 
Media coverage of the incident continues throughout the day. The Indian External Affairs 
Minister and National Security Advisor co-author an article in Times of India describing 
Pakistan’s aggressive behavior, blaming the recent unrest in Kashmir on Pakistani provocateurs 
and recalling the August interdiction of the Pakistani “terror boat.” The article includes a 
warning that while India remains committed to peace, it will defend itself vigorously if attacked. 
Multiple Indian officials echo these same talking points in media interviews. Reuters quotes a 
senior Saudi official who stated that Saudi Arabia rejected India’s request to cease fuel deliveries 
to Pakistan. The official went on to condemn India’s attack on the Pakistani aircraft. The 
Associated Press quotes a senior Russian official as saying that as a result of a request from 
India, Russia is reevaluating pending deliveries of lethal goods to Pakistan, but the review 
process would likely last “a couple of weeks.”  
At 1800hrs on Monday, September 7th, a Pakistani JF-17 squadron from Masroor Air Base in 
Karachi attacks India’s Naliya Air Base, destroying three aircraft on the ground and damaging 
some of the base’s facilities. The JF-17 squadron loses three aircraft during the attack: one 
damaged aircraft returns to base; one crashes in Pakistani territory after the pilot safely ejected; 
and one crashes in Indian territory with the pilot’s fate unknown. Immediately following the 
airstrike, Inter-Services Public Relations releases a statement: “We were forced to take this 
retaliation against Indian aggression. We confined our actions to the incident in question. We do 
not want war or escalation, but we reserve our right to take necessary steps to defend ourselves.” 
Move 2 –T+29 hours to T+60 hours 
Monday, September 7 (2100hrs) to Wednesday, September 9 (0600hrs) 
Within hours of the attack on Naliya, India 
initiates a major naval and air campaign against 
Pakistan. At 2300hrs on September 7th, India 
declares a Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ) 
extending 100nm from the Pakistani coast and 
issues a Notice to Mariners (NOTAM) and 
airmen to keep clear of the conflict area. 
Shortly after the declaration, the Indian Western 
Fleet begins attacking Pakistani shipping and 
ports, and the Eastern Fleet sets sail from the 
Bay of Bengal to assist in enforcing the MEZ. 
At 0600hrs on September 8th, the Indian Air 
Force begins a large-scale offensive against 
Pakistani Air Bases, transportation 
infrastructure, military supply depots, and the 
Pakistan Army HQ. The Indian MEA 
announces shortly after dawn that: “In response 
to a purely defensive act by India, Pakistan 
initiated hostilities by attacking our air base at 
Naliya. India will respond with all its might.” 
Figure 4: Move 2 Military Actions. India declares a MEZ. 
Firing increases along LoC. India strikes Pakistani air bases, 
bridges, infrastructure, and Army HQ. Pakistan severely 
damages INS Vikramaditya. 
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Concurrent with this statement, the government of Pakistan issues a press release saying: 
The Pakistani NCA has convened to review the preparation and posture of our strategic forces. 
Indian aggression and the crisis on the eastern border have adversely affected our ability to 
prosecute the war on extremism. We remain concerned about strategic escalation. We do not 
want war but we will ensure that all our capabilities are employed to defend Pakistan’s 
territorial integrity and security. 
Throughout the morning, Pakistani diplomats are active at the OIC and the UN. The Pakistani 
Foreign Office publicly calls for an emergency meeting of the OIC, asking the organization to 
pass a resolution condemning Indian aggression. The OIC’s permanent secretariat in Saudi 
Arabia meets in the afternoon and issues a resolution condemning India’s broad-based 
aggression against Pakistan. At the UN, Pakistan’s representative presses for a vote on a 
resolution condemning India’s aggression. Two draft resolutions circulate: one drafted by the 
U.S. supported by the UK and France, and another drafted by China supported by the United 
Arab Emirates, currently a rotating member on the UNSC. By early afternoon, the UNSC issues 
a presidency statement condemning the violence, calling on both sides to cease military actions 
and to negotiate a return to the status quo ante. The UN Secretary General calls on both sides to 
halt military activities, noting that a large-scale war would risk the eventual use of nuclear 
weapons. 
At mid-day on September 8th, the Indian 
MEA conducts briefings with all 
ambassadors in New Delhi as well as with 
the media to explain the justification for 
and objectives of India’s military campaign 
against Pakistan. Photos of battle damage 
in Pakistan accompany the joint MEA and 
MOD press briefings to demonstrate 
India’s “preparedness and resolve to see the 
hostilities through to their end,” though 
officials are unwilling to precisely qualify 
the meaning of the word “end.” The Prime 
Minister’s Office activates hotlines with 
major world leaders to explain that 
Pakistan’s continued misadventures have 
compelled India’s response.  
The conflict takes a heavy economic toll by 
mid-afternoon on September 8th. Trading 
halts at the Karachi stock exchange after a 
25 percent drop-off, and the Mumbai stock 
exchange also closes after a massive sell-
off. In Pakistan, the physical movement of 
all goods has ceased due to Indian naval 
and air activity, and all airports are closed. 
Insurance premiums for commercial 
shipping are skyrocketing, even for ships 
Summary of Move 2 Military Actions 
Mon, 7 Sept (2100hrs) to Wed, 9 Sept (0600hrs) 
2100, 7 Sept onward: Heavy combat along the LoC. 
2300, 7 Sept: India declares MEZ (yellow) 100nm 
from Pakistani coast. Sustained naval combat begins; 
India strikes multiple Pakistani naval bases.  
0600, 8 Sept: India initiates airstrikes against 
Pakistani air bases and infrastructure  
By 0600, 9 Sept:  
• IAF strikes bridges along the Indus. 
• IAF strikes military HQs in Islamabad.  
• Movement of Pak Army forces to eastern  
border delayed by IAF air activity. 
• Pak Navy inflicts a mission-kill on the 
Indian aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya, 
that returns to port.  
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arriving or departing from Indian ports. Merchant ships have either turned back to the Persian 
Gulf or been diverted toward other ports in the region. 
Among the growing frenzy of media reports, the news outlets in both countries report evidence 
of cyber-attacks. Pakistan’s Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) states that the 
50 percent decrease in normal electricity levels in Islamabad and Lahore will likely continue for 
the next 48-72 hours. Evidence suggests possible cyber penetration of the electrical grid’s control 
networks. GEO News reports that the Lahore Area Control Center at Allama Iqbal International 
Airport was subjected to Indian cyber-attacks earlier in the day, but the source stated that the 
attack did not disrupt services, which continued until the eventual forced shutdown. An article on 
Dawn’s website quotes an unnamed source from Pakistan’s Askari Bank Ltd. that its networks 
have been heavily probed over the past 24 hours from IP addresses originating in India, but so far 
no loss or breach of client data or financial assets has occurred. IBN reports that the Indian MEA 
website has been hacked and plastered with Pakistani flags, though the source of the attack 
remains unidentified. 
The United States and China express grave concern over the new developments in the P-3 crisis. 
By early evening, the White House spokeswoman announces that the Deputy Secretaries of 
State, Defense, and the Deputy National Security Advisor for South Asia will be attempting to 
travel to New Delhi and Islamabad in the next 24-48 hours. In the meanwhile, the President has 
called the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan to express her concern about the hostilities and 
the risk of escalation. The State Department orders a non-combatant evacuation operation for 
U.S citizens in Pakistan and draws down embassy personnel in India while strongly 
recommending that U.S citizens leave India. A senior Chinese government spokesman calls on 
India to halt its aggression. During the afternoon, the Chinese ambassador to New Delhi delivers 
a note from the Chinese government expressing its very strong concern at the scope of India’s 
military actions and warning India against any threats or actions against Chinese security and 
economic interests. 
Naval and air combat is continuous, and hostilities significantly increase along the LoC during 
the evening hours. At 2200hrs, a Pakistan Navy submarine scores four torpedo hits against the 
Indian carrier INS Vikramaditya, which can no longer launch aircraft. Vikramaditya returns to 
port significantly damaged. After having been subjected to air and artillery strikes throughout the 
day, Pakistani forces along the LoC discover that Indian Special Forces are operating in 
Pakistani rear areas along the Neelum Valley. Combat continues at sea, in the air, and on land 
throughout the night. 
By 0600hrs on Wednesday, September 9th, Pakistan’s air and naval forces have suffered losses 
but its ground forces remain largely intact. The Pakistan Navy is approximately 80 percent 
operational. Several ports, including Karachi and Gwadar, have been damaged by Indian attacks 
but all remain operational. Pakistan’s naval losses include two frigates, one Qing-class 
submarine, and various other minor combatants as well as two additional P-3 Orions and two 
Atlantiques. The Pakistan Air Force is also 80 percent operational. Though many air bases have 
suffered damage from Indian air strikes, they remain operational at varying levels of diminished 
capacity. Pakistan lost 60 aircraft on the ground and another 35 in counter-air operations. The 
Indian Air Force struck a variety of Pakistan Army command and control nodes in and around 
Islamabad and Rawalpindi, but losses are unknown at this time. The Pakistan Army’s 11th and 
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12th Corps arrival on the eastern border is delayed by 48 hours. Nonetheless, Pakistan’s counter-
IBG brigades are fully deployed forward in anticipation of an Indian attack.  
The Indian Army has raised an additional six IBGs from existing forces. The strike corps are 
now moving to reinforce the IBGs along the international border. Full military mobilization 
continues apace. The Indian Air Force has suffered 35 aircraft lost, and with the exception of 
Vikramaditya, the Indian Navy has lost only minor combatants in the preceding day’s combat.  
Move 3 –T+60 hours to T+108 hours 
Wednesday, September 9 (0600hrs) to Friday, 
September 11 (0600hrs) 
As dawn breaks on Wednesday, September 9th, both India 
and Pakistan launch limited offensives across the LoC. 
India attacks with two divisions north of Kargil, seeking a 
penetration of 4-6km to destroy the logistical support node 
for Siachen-based Pakistani troops. Simultaneously, a 
Pakistani brigade attacks into the Neelum Valley, and 
Pakistani troops are making concerted efforts to kill or 
capture the Indian Special Forces operating in their rear 
areas. At 0700hrs, Pakistan declares a MEZ extending 
125nm from the Indian west coast as naval combat 
continues in the Arabian Sea and beyond. Meanwhile, India 
raises the alert level of its strategic forces, begins dispersal 
of its MRBMs and deploys its SSBN submarines to 
wartime patrol stations. Air combat intensifies during the 
morning hours and continues through the next day. As the 
Indian Air Force continues to strike Pakistani air bases, the 
Pakistan Air Force attacks Indian forces, military forces, 
and transportation infrastructure in and around Pathankot, 
successfully destroying the bridge over the Ravi River and 
inflicting significant damage on Indian Air Station 
Pathankot. A PAF strike against Indian air fields in Gujarat, 
however, is interdicted by the IAF and forced to return with 
heavy casualties. As the day’s news cycle begins, the 
Indian government issues the following statement that 
government officials and pundits echo on political talk 
shows throughout the day: 
Pakistan’s military has brought upon the nation and its 
people unwarranted and irreparable damage and loss of 
life and property. India has no hostile intent, but its forces 
are ready to take adequate counter-action. Pakistan should 
realize the consequences of further escalation and desist 
from venturing into it. 
Figure 5: Move 3 Military Actions. Both 
countries attack across LoC. IAF strikes 
multiple PAF airfields, but PAF strikes in 
Gujarat are thwarted. Pakistan declares 
MEZ. Pakistan announces: “de-mated status 
has been removed.”  
Note: nuclear symbols are only intended to 
convey elevated readiness. They do not 
denote specific locations 
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On the diplomatic front, Pakistan intensifies its efforts to get an immediate decision from the 
UNSC condemning Indian aggression. Pakistan’s UN Ambassador makes an impassioned speech 
calling upon India to desist from further acts of aggression “which may lead to the use of nuclear 
weapons.” Meanwhile, Pakistan’s envoys to the P5 members are requesting that these countries 
pressure India to cease its hostilities as these actions may lead to nuclear exchanges. ISPR issues 
a public warning to India to desist from further acts of aggression, and Pakistan recalls its 
ambassador from India. 
Around noon on September 9th, the Prime Ministers in both countries address their nations. The 
Indian Prime Minister’s Office releases the following statement:  
India has no intention to seek a military objective other than putting an end to Pakistan’s pattern 
of provocative actions including terrorism directed against India. Indian forces will continue 
operations until such time as Pakistan terminates its military action which it started with the 
intrusion of the P-3 Orion and the attack on Naliya AFS. India cautions Pakistan to desist from 
even thinking of any disastrous escalation. 
Around the same time, Pakistan’s ISPR 
announces that “the NCA has removed de-
mated status for Pakistan’s strategic forces and 
directed some assets to disperse.” Shortly 
thereafter, Pakistan’s Prime Minister addresses 
the nation from the floor of parliament: 
The Pakistani state is fully resolved to defeat 
Indian aggression. The society is united behind 
this effort. The full military capabilities of the 
state will be leveraged in the interest of 
national defense. The international community 
has a responsibility to prevent escalation to 
another dimension of warfare. 
At 1800hrs, Pakistan launches a major ground 
offensive in the Sialkot sector across the border 
with the aim of cutting off Highway 1a at 
Samba. ISPR characterizes the offensive as an 
act of proactive self-defense intended to 
preempt an imminent Indian offensive. Over 
the next 12 hours, the Pakistani thrust achieves 
an eight-kilometer penetration into Indian 
territory before Indian forces regroup and 
counterattack around 0600hrs on Thursday, 
September 10th. Both sides attempt to commit 
reinforcements as the air battle rages overhead, 
but refugee flows are inhibiting operations.  
The Indian and Pakistani media continue to 
report the latest developments. GEO News and 
Summary of Move 3 Military Actions 
Wed, 9 Sept (0600hrs) to Fri, 11 Sept (0600hrs) 
Ground actions: -­‐ India and Pakistan launch near-
simultaneous offensives in different 
sectors along the LoC. -­‐ Pak launches an offensive east of Sialkot 
to sever Hwy 1-a, supported by air & 
artillery strikes 
Air actions:  -­‐ IAF strikes multiple PAF airfields.  -­‐ PAF airstrike in Gujarat thwarted by IAF. 
Naval actions: -­‐ Pak declares MEZ 125nm off Indian west 
coast. -­‐ Naval combat continues with heavy Pak 
losses and moderate Indian losses.  
Strategic forces:  -­‐ Prior to PM’s national address, Pakistan 
announces that “de-mated status has been 
removed.” 
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other Pakistani news stations begin 24/7 news coverage entitled: “PAKISTAN UNDER 
ASSAULT.” An article appears on the Al Jazeera website with grisly photos of two Indian 
Special Forces soldiers who were killed in the Neelum Valley. Citing an unnamed senior MOD 
official, CNN-IBN reports that a large number of Indian landing ships are being loaded with 
supplies and troops in Porbandar, portending a potential Indian amphibious invasion of Pakistan. 
The MEA website is temporarily taken offline following hacking and defacement. 
Late in the evening on September 10th, the UN Security Council passed a unanimous resolution 
calling on both India and Pakistan to cease hostilities. China initially opposed the resolution but 
joined the consensus shortly after Pakistan launched its ground offensive into India. American 
and Chinese diplomats are active in the region. The Chinese ambassadors in Islamabad and New 
Delhi deliver private messages to the Indian and Pakistani governments informing them that the 
conflict needs to end before it threatens wider interests. Two groups of U.S. envoys arrive in 
Islamabad and Delhi to facilitate discussions between the U.S. President and the Prime Ministers 
in both countries and to assist in parallel contacts through military and diplomatic channels.  
By morning on Friday, September 11th, the economic consequences of the on-going crisis 
continue to mount. No civilian or commercial aviation or shipping is moving in or out of 
Pakistan, and most air carriers have ceased operation into and within India. Insurance premiums 
remain extremely high for commercial shipping in both India and Pakistan, though some ships 
have continued to approach India’s southern and eastern coasts. The price of oil has jumped 5 
percent in reaction to shipping disruptions. The Karachi and Mumbai stock exchanges remain 
closed. Islamabad and Lahore continue to experience electricity distribution challenges but grid 
control networks appear to be broadly functional. Pakistani cities begin to experience unrest due 
to the scarcity and rising cost of petroleum products as the Pakistani oil reserves held near naval 
facilities have been destroyed. The Mumbai Air Traffic Control Center has been experiencing 
network anomalies causing degradation in handling volume. Since the initial investigations 
revealed unusual network activity linked to IP addresses in Pakistan, the Indian media is 
speculating that the anomalies are the result of an offensive cyber-attack against Indian air traffic 
control. As a result, some analysts are questioning the safety of air travel in India.  
At 0600hrs on Friday, September 11th, the military situation remains tense. Massive armor 
formations are locked in heavy combat at the site of Pakistani penetration opposite Sialkot, and 
intense combat continues along the LoC. Pakistan has lost 100 tanks, 75 armored personnel 
carriers, and 8 aircraft and suffered heavy infantry and civilian casualties as a result of the 
ground offensive. India has lost 50-60 tanks, 20 Casspir mine-protected vehicles and other 
military vehicles, and has also suffered heavy infantry and civilian casualties. India’s strike 
corps, however, are beginning to take positions in close support of the forward-deployed IBGs. 
India’s air campaign has taken a heavy toll on the Pakistan Air Force, which has been degraded 
by 50 percent. The air environment is now more permissive for IAF, which can achieve local air 
superiority at will. At sea, India has shifted its main effort to anti-ship and anti-submarine 
warfare, but Pakistani counteraction has inflicted losses of two SSKs, two minor combatants, and 
one merchant vessel sunk on approach to Mumbai harbor. The Pakistan Navy, however, has lost 
a further six FFGs, two Agostas, and several minor combatants. The Pakistan Navy is now only 
40 percent operational. 
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Move 4 (Open Adjudication) –T+108 hours  
Friday, September 11 (0600hrs) and beyond 
Beginning on Friday, September 11th, India intended to launch 
a four-pronged offensive against Pakistan. In the north, India 
would reinforce its cross-LoC operations to isolate Pakistani 
forces on the Siachen Glacier. At the site of the Pakistani 
intrusion opposite Sialkot, Indian forces would attack to 
“restore the sanctity of the international border.” All along the 
international border, Indian forces would attack with the aim of 
severing Pakistan’s north-south lines of communications at the 
Indus River south of Fort Abbas. Finally, in the far south, India 
would launch an amphibious landing from Porbandar against 
the Pakistani coastline as a feint to draw defensive forces away 
from the international border. To support the operation, India 
intended to conduct offensive cyber operations against 
Pakistan’s energy and telecom sectors as well as Pakistan’s 
military and strategic command and control systems in order to 
create chaos, disrupt operations, and discover the locations of 
Pakistan’s nuclear assets. The Indian Navy would continue to 
blockade the Pakistani coast and attack Pakistani shipping 
while defending Indian shipping against Pakistani attacks, and 
the Indian Air Force would continue to support both land and 
sea operations. The Ministry of Defense would announce that 
“India’s deterrence is in place,” deploying forty percent of its 
IRBM and MRBM strategic forces to operational locations. 
India’s SSBN submarine would remain on patrol.  
India would justify its offensive by demonstrating that while 
India has shown restraint in the face of Pakistan’s continued 
irresponsibility, “India will [now] do whatever it takes to 
protect its territorial integrity and sovereignty.” At the UN, 
India’s representative would tell the UNSC that “Pakistan has 
threatened the use of nuclear weapons; by launching a cross 
border offensive [opposite Sialkot, during Move 3], Pakistan 
has revealed the true purpose of its nuclear weapons: to further 
militarism.” India would convince the United States, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom 
not to allow the UNSC to “encourage Pakistan’s misadventure.” The Ministry of External Affairs 
would inform China’s Ambassador to India that “peace and stability are threatened by continued 
encouragement of Pakistan.” The Prime Minister would announce that “India has given Pakistan 
every opportunity to end this conflict, but Pakistan has chosen to escalate and violate the 
international boundary. The onus is now on Pakistan to de-escalate.” In the media, India would 
reiterate its consistent restraint, release photos of battle damage in Pakistan, and point out that 
Pakistan has “brought destruction on its populace under the cloak of proactive self-defense.” 
India would recall its ambassador to Pakistan but nonetheless activate backchannel 
communication links to maintain some level of contact.  
Figure 6: Move 4 Military Actions. 
Pakistan consolidates gains and deploys to 
defend the border. India launches four 
offensives: 
1. Push deep across the LoC. 
2. Expel Pakistani salient and “restore 
the sanctity of the IB.” 
3. Attack across the IB to cut Pakistan’s 
lines of communication. 
4. Conduct amphibious landing (feint). 
 
Strategic forces are operational: 40 percent 
in India; 100 percent in Pakistan; SSBNs at 
sea.  
 
Note: nuclear symbols are only intended to 
convey elevated readiness. They do not 
denote specific location. 
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Summary of Move 4 Military Actions 
Fri, 11 Sept (0600hrs) onwards 
Pakistan consolidates gains and deploys to 
defend the border. 
India launches four offensives: 
1. Push deep across the LoC. 
2. Expel Pakistani salient and “restore 
the sanctity of the IB.” 
3. Attack across the IB to cut Pakistan’s 
lines of communication (offensive 
planned for four days). 
4. Conduct amphibious landing on Pak 
coast (intended as feint). 
Both MEZ remain in effect; naval combat 
continues. 
Strategic forces are operational: -­‐ India: 40 percent of MRBMs & 
RBMs deployed at operational 
locations.  -­‐ Pakistan: all forces deployed in 
operational mode.  -­‐ Both: nuclear-armed submarines  
remain at sea.  
Pakistan intended to consolidate its territorial gains and defend Pakistan against further attack, 
including from amphibious landings in the south. All forces would be deployed in forward battle 
locations to either defend against attack or launch their own offensive if required. The Pakistan 
Team noted, however, that the adverse air environment influenced their decision to consolidate 
rather than expand their bridgehead opposite Sialkot. To complicate an Indian attack, Pakistan 
intended to conduct offensive cyber operations against India’s finance sector and military C2 in 
order to create confusion and induce paralysis. 
Additionally, Pakistan intended to deploy all 
strategic assets in operational mode, leaving its 
SSBN submarine out on patrol. Pakistan would 
announce that its forces have “made sufficient 
gains against India and taken strong measures 
against Indian ingresses. Pakistan welcomes the 
UNSC resolution and expects that India will 
respect the resolution and cease its offensive 
actions.” At the UN, Pakistan also presses for a 
resolution of the Kashmir dispute in accordance 
with the UNSC resolutions of 1948. 
The open adjudication session prompted debate on 
India’s interpretation of events, unintentional 
escalation, and Pakistan’s nuclear redlines. First, 
the Pakistan Team questioned why, throughout the 
crisis, the Indian Team consistently listed proxy 
conflict as a reason to take action against Pakistan. 
The Pakistan Team believed that in the specific 
instance of the P-3 incident, Pakistan was the 
aggrieved party and other issues should not be 
brought into play. Moreover, the Pakistan Team 
stated that the real issue went beyond proxy 
conflict to the Kashmir dispute originating in 
1947. The Indian Team responded that in the 
context of the broader scenario, they viewed the P-
3 border violation as a “continuation of a series of 
crises” involving Pakistani misbehavior, including proxy conflict, as described in the scenario 
brief. The Indian Team pointedly noted that the NCA guidance specifically tasked them with 
“punishing Pakistanis…for the cumulative negative effects felt by India from terrorist attacks,” 
and thus they could not avoid bringing the issue to bear. The Indian Team felt that while the 
trigger event was not a sufficient “Sarajevo event” to realistically provoke all-out war with 
Pakistan, India would nonetheless pursue a more subtle form of punishment campaign against 
Pakistan in such a scenario. The Pakistan Team reasoned that the lasting solution was not a 
punishment campaign but the resolution of the Kashmir dispute, which they had planned to 
pursue during Move 4. 
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Next, the teams discussed their efforts to pursue escalation 
dominance, summarized by the Indian Team as: “we always 
plan for the worst and then take the appropriate response.” 
During Move 1, the Pakistan Team attempted to control 
escalation by limiting their retaliatory attack to a “response 
in kind” against Naliya Air Base. After India’s air and naval 
campaign against Pakistan in Move 2, Pakistan again 
attempted to respond “in kind” during Move 3 by attacking 
across the “working boundary” opposite Sialkot (see Figure 
5) to put India on the defensive and gain leverage for war 
termination. The Indian Team, however, viewed this attack 
as escalatory for four reasons: 1) it crossed the international 
boundary (see Figure 7); 2) it contradicted Pakistan’s 
demands at the UN; 3) it targeted a “sensitive area,” Hwy 1-
a; and 4) it coincided with China’s support for the UNSC 
resolution. The Indian Team concluded that Pakistan was 
conducting a major offensive with Chinese endorsement and 
that India was therefore no longer “constrained” by the 
international boundary. Thus, during Move 4, India 
attempted to contain escalation by responding with a 
punishing attack against the Pakistan Army, which, in their 
words, “remained unrestrained with aggressive intentions.” 
The Pakistan Team noted that such an attack would most 
likely lead to “a new generation of warfare,” implying the use 
of strategic forces.  
Finally, the teams discussed the potential for escalation into 
the nuclear domain. The Control Team questioned whether or 
not India considered Pakistan’s nuclear redlines in planning 
its Move 4 offensive across the international border. The Indian Team made three points. First, 
they noted that the crossing of Pakistan’s “alleged nuclear threshold” had not yet produced a 
response. Second, they specified that their attack was intended not to take territory but to punish 
the Pakistan Army. Thus, the territorial threshold would not be crossed. They stated that they 
would “calibrate [their] response and continually reassess to see about crossing nuclear redlines.” 
Third, they noted that they viewed Pakistan’s Hatf-IX Nasr battlefield nuclear weapons not as 
strategic systems but “simply as multiple launch rockets that will be targeted.” As noted earlier, 
the Pakistan Team stated that if India pursued its planned offensive for Move 4, the conflict 
would mostly likely escalate to the next level.  
  
Figure 7: Indo-Pak border.  
Red = disputed 
Green = international boundary 
Yellow = working boundary 
Purple = Line of Control 
India and Pakistan have different 
interpretations of the border near Sialkot, 
as shown in the dashed box above. 
 
Note: map not drawn to scale – locations 
are approximate.   
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Vignette 1 – Nuclear Detonation 
Control presented the players with the following hypothetical event: 
Two hours ago, as Pakistan deploys its nuclear forces, you begin receiving reports of a nuclear 
detonation in Pakistan in the vicinity of intense Indian aerial bombardment. Bolstering the 
battlefield reports, an Indian pilot reports a successful PGM attack against what he described as 
a Pakistani ballistic missile transporter erector launcher (TEL). He reported seeing an 
exceptionally large post-strike secondary explosion and what he referred to as a “fireball in the 
shape of a mushroom cloud.” 
Control asked the players to consider their response to the situation based on the following 
questions:  
1. How does this event change your threat perceptions?  
India Team Only: To what extent are you concerned that this event will precipitate 
nuclear escalation? Does this constitute first use? What if Indian Special Forces were 
operating in the area and were killed as a result of the detonation? 
Pakistan Team Only: How will this affect your ongoing deployment operations? Do you 
consider this event an impingement on your nuclear redlines? 
2. What are your consequence management considerations? 
3. How would you determine the exact circumstances (e.g. deliberate use, accidental 
detonation, or unclear) behind how the nuclear explosion occurred? Does this change 
how you react?  
4. What are your immediate political and military reactions to this event? 
5. In the immediate aftermath of this event, what messages would you send to (1) 
friends/partners/allies, (2) your domestic population, and (3) your adversary? 
The nuclear detonation did not seem to affect either team’s threat perceptions or initiate an 
immediate military response. The Indian Team stated that they would “look at cease fire options” 
only in the event of “unnecessary escalation.” India’s first reaction would be to inform Pakistan – 
perhaps through direct PM-to-PM communication – that India had “no intention to target 
Pakistan’s strategic assets.” For the Pakistan Team, the event “would not alter our deployment 
patterns” except to require that strategic assets shift to alternate locations and improve security. 
The Pakistan Team responded favorably to India’s suggestion of a direct PM to PM 
communication. They further noted that Pakistan would determine the true circumstances of the 
detonation through a direct site inspection. Pakistan’s “immediate concern” would be informing 
its public, after which it would consider how to inform the international community, if it chose to 
do so. Neither side felt that the detonation has crossed a nuclear threshold at this stage, though 
the Pakistan Team noted that the results of their investigation could affect their ultimate 
response.  
The teams identified a need for improved consequence management mechanisms beyond the 
DGMO hotline. Pakistan argued that the incident invoked the 2007 agreement8 between India 
and Pakistan that requires notification of a nuclear accident, but India argued that this agreement 
                                                
8 This agreement refers to the “Agreement On Reducing The Risk From Accidents Relating To Nuclear Weapons” 
between India and Pakistan, signed in February 2007. See http://www.stimson.org/research 
-pages/agreement-on-reducing-the-risk-from-accidents-relating-to-nuclear-weapon/. 
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does not apply to wartime incidents. The Indian Team felt that while the 2007 agreement has 
proven to be a “skeleton with no flesh,” it could “open the door wider” for a more 
comprehensive agreement between the two countries that could address this type of situation. In 
the Indian Team’s perception, the world does not believe that India and Pakistan can “handle 
these [nuclear] weapons,” so a comprehensive agreement to avoid escalation by communicating 
accidental nuclear detonations would prove that “we can handle this.”  
Both teams felt that the example of an accidental detonation was unlikely and unrealistic. The 
Indian Team stated that in the case of a real event, Pakistan would accuse India of either a 
deliberate attack or a sabotage mission. The Indian Team reasoned that Pakistan would be 
motivated to “pin the detonation on its adversary” because an accident would cause “Pakistan to 
lose credibility in its deterrence.” The Pakistan Team dismissed India’s reasoning as an 
“immature” assessment of Pakistani strategic thinking. Both teams felt that accidental nuclear 
detonations were extremely unlikely because they assess their respective arsenals to be safe from 
detonation. Both teams engaged in an extensive debate on U.S. standards regarding one-point 
safety.9 Neither team seemed prepared to countenance such an event or to respond to either its 
physical effects or the political consequences.  
                                                
9 “One-point safety” means that the likelihood of an accidental nuclear explosion is smaller than one in one million. 
For a concise definition of one-point safety, see http://www.dawn.com/news/1178617. 
Summary of Vignette Responses 
Figure 8 (right): 
Summary of Nuclear 
Detonation Vignette. 
Overall, both sides 
seemed unprepared for 
accidental detonations. 
However, both sides 
agreed that they need to 
improve bilateral 
agreements such as the 
2007 CBM to handle such 
contingencies. Neither 
side wants to be labeled 
as “irresponsible” by the 
international community. 
Figure 9 (left): Summary 
of War Termination 
Vignette. Overall, the 
positions are mutually 
exclusive. India does not 
consider the ramifications 
or consequences of 
defeating a nuclear-armed 
Pakistan. Pakistan believes 
that terrorism is 
insufficient as a casus 
belli. 
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Vignette 2 – War Termination 
Control asked the players to consider a war termination plan in the event that their respective 
governments accept the UNSC resolution calling for a cessation of hostilities. Control asked the 
players to consider the following questions:  
1. What are the critical military, diplomatic, and informational issues for your country in:  
a) transitioning from combat operations to a ceasefire, and then 
b) negotiating a broader resolution to the crisis? 
2. What goals/gains would you seek to preserve in any transition to war termination? 
3. What are areas where you would be willing to provide concessions to the other side in 
order to facilitate a negotiated settlement? 
4. What measures would you seek in any settlement that would decrease the chances for 
future crises? 
5. How would you ‘sell’ the cessation of hostilities to your respective domestic audiences? 
The Pakistan Team anticipated a UN-mandated ceasefire followed by bilateral negotiations 
between India and Pakistan. Pakistan would use its territorial gains during the bargaining process 
to develop a framework that would be mutually agreeable for both countries. To decrease the 
chances for future crises, Pakistan would seek international mediation on the Kashmir dispute, 
with all Indian forces withdrawing from Kashmir south of the Beas River. Pakistan would count 
the ceasefire as a victory because the Pakistan military successfully stood up against the Indian 
military.  
The Indian Team, on the other hand, stated that they would not accept the UN ceasefire unless its 
terms addressed all of India’s war termination objectives. Furthermore, India would not accept 
any ceasefire with Pakistan unless Pakistan similarly accepted India’s ceasefire terms in total. To 
achieve a victory, India would need “tangible gains,” including but not limited to Pakistani 
concessions concerning the use of proxies or some sort of territorial concessions along the LoC. 
India would ensure that the Pakistan Army was sufficiently defeated so that Pakistan could not 
claim a victory in any form.  
The teams debated the UN’s role in conflict resolution as well as the negotiating process. The 
Pakistan Team felt that the Indian Team was disregarding the effects of international pressure as 
well as the UN’s ability to enforce a ceasefire under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.10 The Indian 
Team responded that in their view, Indo-Pak conflicts recur because previous wars were never 
ended decisively. The Indian Team felt that Pakistan “keeps coming back again and again and 
reinterpreting [past conflicts] to Pakistan’s advantage.” For India, conflict will only end when 
Pakistan accepts war termination conditions that do not allow it to revisit the issue. Pakistan 
argued that “the end of hostilities is a bargaining process, not the imposition of conditions.” India 
responded by saying, “that is where we disagree.”   
                                                
10 Chapter 7 of the UN Charter governs peace enforcement operations, which can include the use of force under 
specific rules of engagement. For additional information, see: http://www.un.org/en/documents 
/charter/chapter7.shtml.  




As noted in the Introduction of this report, the 2013 TTX generated four primary conclusions: 
1. In a crisis, the default for both sides is an assumption of intentional, malicious action. 
These entrenched threat perceptions increase the likelihood of active conflict.  
2. India’s conventional force advantage creates an incentive to use maximum force quickly 
to achieve a quick, impressive victory before international intervention forces a cessation 
of hostilities.  
3. Limited war for India is a full-scale war for Pakistan. While India argues that it can 
calibrate an offensive and stop short of redlines, Pakistan cannot trust that India would 
restrain itself from existential destruction, and thus remains willing to exercise all 
options.  
4. As a limited war escalates horizontally and vertically, pressure to lower the nuclear 
threshold grows, in part as a result of the operational challenges posed by tactical nuclear 
weapons. War termination also becomes difficult, as both sides seek to consolidate gains 
and minimize losses so as to improve their post-conflict bargaining position.  
These four initial conclusions were tested and ultimately reinforced through the second TTX. It 
seems the intervening years have done little to ameliorate these dilemmas. This second iteration 
further illuminated the strategic dilemma between India and Pakistan and illustrated the difficulty 
of escalation control during a “limited war.” SASW 2.0 added nuance and depth to our 
understanding of these dynamics. From the SASW 2.0 game, we add four new major findings. 
Home Alone Syndrome 
Absent a designated political leader, the Indian Team was inclined toward a heavy-handed 
military response to the crisis, which we have dubbed “home alone syndrome.” During Move 2, 
for example, the team recommended a major offensive across the international boundary (IB) in 
response to Pakistan’s retaliatory strike against Naliya Air Base during Move 1. The Control 
Team, representing the National Command Authority (NCA) for both the Indian and Pakistani 
teams, rejected this option in favor of a more measured response that better simulated Indian 
civil-military relations. However, following a Pakistani offensive adjacent to Sialkot during 
Move 3, Control allowed the Indian Team to go ahead with the planned offensive during Move 
4. When asked to consider whether this risked crossing Pakistan’s stated territorial nuclear 
redlines, the Indian Team stated that they understood it was a risk, but that they would 
“calibrate” their offensive and “continually reassess” the situation to prevent the conflict from 
going nuclear.  
These observations lead to two conclusions, one concerning civil-military relations in India and 
one concerning Indian strategic thinking. Typically, the Indian political authority exercises full 
control over the military and has historically been unwilling to devolve authority to its generals 
except in extreme circumstances. We conclude that Indian civil-military relations were not 
realistically demonstrated within this game, as real-world Indian political leaders would have 
been unlikely to allow the degree of freedom the military received in-game. Further, during the 
limited window granted for military operations, there was active inter-service competition for 
primacy, with only a limited attempt to synergize the three services’ efforts. These observations 
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reinforce the standard narrative about the origins and rationale for India’s Cold Start doctrine.11 
This problem of the politicians seeking punishment and deterrence of future provocations and the 
military seeking destruction has been identified in several TTXs.   
More ominous, however, was the Indian military’s apparent lack of concern for the potential 
nuclear consequences of their choices. For example, by the fifth in-game day, India had reduced 
the combat efficiency of Pakistan Air Force and Navy by 50 percent and 60 percent, 
respectively. Despite this extreme destruction, when political pressure for de-escalation and war 
termination mounted, the Indian military resisted because the Pakistan Army and Pakistan’s 
nuclear weapons were still intact. There was little consideration of Pakistan’s likely red lines, 
and Indian military players indicated that they would not allow Pakistan’s nuclear capability to 
hamper their military objectives.  
Nuclear Signaling was Ineffective 
The results of this exercise suggest that mutually assured destruction is insufficient to limit 
escalation in a war in South Asia. Despite the potential for countervalue strikes or the use of 
tactical nuclear weapons, India implemented a Cold Start campaign. As the crisis intensified over 
the course of the game, it became clear that de-escalation was unlikely. Facing what it perceived 
to be an existential threat, Pakistan needed to signal the risks of continuing military operations in 
order to establish intra-war deterrence.  
Aside from the early deployment of nuclear-armed submarines to unspecified holding areas, both 
sides kept strategic weapons put away and out of the environment until Move 3. India avoided 
nuclear signaling because it is incentivized to keep any conflict with Pakistan at a conventional 
level.  
Pakistan kept its nuclear weapons off the battlefield and out of sight in order to signal this was a 
purely conventional matter with India. By Move 3, however, it became clear that if Pakistan 
waited much longer, it would be too late to deploy its tactical nuclear weapons for any strategic 
or operational effect. As noted earlier, Pakistan’s dilemmas regarding optimal deployment and 
employment parameters for TNW are very similar to the challenges NATO faced in fielding 
nuclear weapons during the Cold War on the Central Front in Germany. The wartime articulation 
of command and control between the conventional and nuclear domain and the challenge of 
ensuring field security during conflict is a significantly different problem set than that of 
managing arsenals in peacetime storage. This is the Goldilocks Dilemma: when is it “just right” 
to deploy TNW? During this TTX, Pakistan waited a remarkably long time—what some might 
consider to be too late.  
 
  
                                                11 For a comprehensive overview of the Cold Start doctrine, see Walter C. Ladwig III, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars? 
The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine,” International Security 32, no 3 (Winter 2007/2008). 
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Ambiguous Nuclear Thresholds Lack Credibility 
As noted above, the Indian Team did not accept Pakistan’s ambiguous nuclear thresholds as 
credible: Pakistani deterrence failed by Move 2, and in our assessment the Indian Team had 
crossed three of Pakistan’s alleged nuclear redlines by Move 4.12 By the end of Move 2, Pakistan 
faced substantial economic hardship as a result of India’s maritime exclusion zone (MEZ), 
attacks against ports and airfields, and cyber-attacks against the Pakistani electricity grid. By the 
end of Move 3, the Karachi stock exchange had closed, and Pakistani citizens had begun rioting 
over skyrocketing oil prices. Most significantly, Pakistan’s naval and air forces verged upon 
combat ineffectiveness at over 50 percent degradation. By the end of Move 4, India had captured 
significant swaths of territory between the international boundary and the Indus River, and the 
Pakistan Army was locked in an intense defensive fight all along the border.  
The Indian Team seemed to believe that Pakistan’s nuclear thresholds were associated only with 
unacceptable territorial gains or destruction of the Pakistan Army, yet they were willing to cross 
these thresholds in a “calibrated” manner to achieve war termination on their own terms.  
The Pakistan Team’s actions seemed to confirm these perceptions. Faced with a spiraling 
economic situation and heavy losses incurred by their navy and air forces, the Pakistan Team 
showed significant restraint by not deploying nuclear weapons until 100 hours into the unfolding 
of military operations. Indeed, the nuclear weapons systems were not mated until Move 3, with a 
public announcement that the “de-mated status [of the weapons] has been removed,”—long after 
the economic and destructive thresholds had presumably been crossed.  
Pakistan continues to pursue a strategy of nuclear ambiguity because this strategy gives them the 
greatest flexibility and, in their assessment, the greatest amount of deterrence vis-à-vis India. 
One team member noted that in retrospect, Pakistan would most likely have deployed its 
strategic systems earlier than Move 4, given the levels of physical and economic destruction and 
the losses inflicted upon the Pakistani naval and air forces.  
Through this exercise, it becomes clear that Pakistan runs the risk of deterrence failure at two 
levels: prewar deterrence and re-establishing deterrence in the midst of conflict. The breakout of 
conventional war itself is the first level of deterrence breakdown. We should not read too much 
into this initial failure, of course; deterrence failure at this level is, in part, an artifact of the 
game’s structure. The objective of the game was to explore conflict escalation dynamics rather 
than conflict prevention mechanisms, and thus did not offer the players the option of avoiding a 
militarized response to the initial trigger event.  
The real challenge for Pakistan, however, is to establish intra-war deterrence. The Indian Team 
seemed unconvinced by Pakistan’s assertions regarding first use of tactical nuclear weapons, and 
appeared willing to risk their use. By the time India were to complete its limited war objectives, 
however, Pakistan’s position would be substantially degraded, with little hope that its nuclear 
weapons could salvage the conflict.  
                                                
12 In 2002, the then Pakistani Strategic Plans Division (SPD) Director-General Lt. General Khalid Kidwai listed four 
general conditions that could elicit a Pakistani nuclear response: territorial occupation; armed forces degradation; 
economic strangulation; and domestic destabilization. See Interview of Pakistan’s former Director-General of the 
Strategic Plans Division, Khalid Kidwai, by the Landau Network-Centro Volta in February 2002, available at 
http://www.pugwash.org/september11/pakistan-nuclear.htm. 
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Non-Military Options and Political Solutions Remain Elusive  
South Asian security experts are still exploring the application of new instruments of statecraft. 
Throughout the conflict, both teams emphasized kinetic military action in their responses to the 
trigger event and in-game moves. The other elements of national power—diplomatic, 
informational, and economic—were incorporated as afterthoughts or were meant as support for 
the military actions. Unsurprisingly, India was more inclined to use soft power tools than 
Pakistan. There were notable attempts to leverage India’s market position to create economic 
hardship for Pakistan, such as approaching Middle Eastern countries to request an oil embargo 
against Pakistan. As a smaller, less economically powerful nation, Pakistan is limited in its 
ability to be proactive by its lesser clout in the system. The Indian Team was also more inclined 
to apply cyber tools. Neither side developed or exercised new ideas for diplomatic action. 
There are several possible reasons for the de-emphasis of so-called soft power tools. The first is 
simply a lack of familiarity with the options. Previous games have focused solely on military 
actions, and the introduction of the full DIME spectrum and the additional tasks associated with 
these new tools may have been overwhelming for the players. It is equally possible, however, 
that there simply are not many coercive, non-military tools available to India and Pakistan, 
particularly not in a militarized crisis situation. The rapidity with which conflict escalates 
complicates traditional diplomatic efforts, which only underscores the need to have conflict de-
escalation mechanisms in place before a crisis occurs. 
Reliance on External De-escalation 
India and Pakistan do not have a strategy for war termination or de-escalation beyond the 
intervention of external powers. In keeping with historical precedent, Pakistan wanted early 
international intervention to prevent escalation. Throughout the conflict, the Pakistan Team made 
it known that international agencies and actors, particularly the United States and the P5, would 
be sought as intermediaries. Nevertheless, there was a palpable frustration in the Pakistan Team 
because they believed that they were the aggrieved party but that nobody would understand or 
take their side, with the notable exception of China. This lack of reliable allies has led Pakistan 
to believe that they must go it alone—hence the reliance on nuclear threats. Little consideration 
was given to the possibility that the international community may not have much leverage to 
convince either side to cease hostilities in the short time before the conflict reaches a nuclear 
threshold. 
 
Similarly, so long as the Indian Team’s punishment campaign was in effect, few options were 
considered for bilateral communication or negotiation with Pakistan. Once achieved, India 
desired the international community to convince Pakistan to cease hostilities on terms favorable 
to India. Here too there was no acknowledgment that the international community may be unable 
to act quickly and decisively to prevent further escalation.  
 
War Termination Vignette 
By Move 4, each side had committed to territorial gains beyond the current LoC and IB. Each 
side decided that these gains would be bartering leverage for eventual war termination 
negotiations. However, beyond the return of territory taken during the war, neither side could 
agree to terms that would satisfy the other. The Indian Team was committed to terminating the 
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war on terms that would ensure Pakistan understood it was defeated, including significant 
attrition of ground forces in addition to the existing destruction of the air and naval forces.  
Even the return of territory was problematic, especially regarding the changes to the status quo 
along the LoC. The Indian Team stated its intention to keep any favorable gains along the LoC 
despite whatever concessions were made to cease hostilities. To the team, this additional land 
was simply a return of Indian territory to its rightful place, and they were unwilling to forfeit it. 
Meanwhile, the Pakistan Team was determined that the terms of war termination must be 
sellable to their domestic audience as either significant gains or at least as a marginal victory—
including no change to the status quo along the Line of Control.  
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Conclusions and Next Steps 
Naturally, there are numerous important questions left unanswered by this workshop. What 
levers does the United States or the P5 have in a conflict of this nature? What is the role of the 
international community? To what extent are the dynamics seen in SASW 1.0 and SASW 2.0 
reflective of real policy and doctrine, and to what extent are they player preference? Future 
iterations of the South Asian Stability Workshop series should incorporate additional checks and 
balances to better reflect Indian civil-military relations, though short of designating a team player 
to act as Prime Minister, the current mechanism of assigning the Control Team the additional 
duty of National Command Authority may still be the best option. Another potential avenue is to 
incorporate the United States and China as player teams. While the Control Team has portrayed 
these countries as neutral, a real crisis would certainly draw them in, and it would be worth 
exploring how international involvement affects the India-Pakistan dynamic.   
Nevertheless, certain dynamics are unlikely to change, even with the addition of third parties. 
There is a clear mismatch of doctrines and instruments between Pakistan and India, and there is 
an unwillingness to take the other party’s threats seriously. Both sides have adapted Thomas 
Schelling’s “threat that leaves something to chance” to a South Asian context, and both engage 
in risk manipulation strategies in order to secure the advantage before international intervention. 
This process resembles a nuclear game of “chicken” as both sides push each other to the brink.  
Both sides seemed concerned with overturning traditional perceptions. For Pakistan, the message 
was “we’re not as crazy as you think we are.” They showed remarkable, perhaps incredible, 
restraint at the conventional and nuclear levels, and sought a tit-for-tat dynamic. For India, the 
message was “we’re not as benign as you think we are.” This may have been driven in part by 
Home Alone syndrome, but may also have been an effort to underscore India’s willingness to use 
punitive force despite the threatened consequences.  
The problem today and for the near future is that in order to avoid nuclear catastrophe, both sides 
must fight a carefully-calibrated plan; however, the only tools available are blunt instruments 
that are incapable of meeting the demand for strategic precision. Economic, informational, and 
cyber warfare are poorly understood. This is where the idea of “victory” under the nuclear 
overhang becomes very risky. So long as it has its strategic forces and army intact, Pakistan is 
unlikely to accept imposed conditionality from India, and so long as Pakistan’s army and 
strategic forces remain secure, India is unlikely to unilaterally cease hostilities. Both sides would 
rather fight it out.  
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Appendix A: Military Modernization Chart 
This chart provides a summary of military advances up to 2020 as provided to the players.  
 India Pakistan 
Summary Restructuring defense establishment and modernizing forces rapidly. 
Modernizing forces but at a slower pace 
than India.  
Land 
- 4 Integrated Battle Groups 
(IBGs)* within the pivot corps 
deployed against Pakistan 
- Increased mobility of mechanized 
and armored forces (T-90s) 
- One infantry division improved 
with F-INSAS 
- Mechanized forces deployed for 




- Improved rotary wing capability: 
- Attack (Apache Longbow) 
- Transport capability (Chinook) 
- Increased number of multi-role 
fixed-wing aircraft – French 
Rafale 
- Added 12 JF-17 squadrons 




Greater blue water capability 
- One additional aircraft carrier (2 
total) 
Power projection remains limited 
- 1 Agosta submarine with nuclear 
cruise missile capability (500km) 
ISR 
Strengthened Army communications  
- ELINT  
- AWACs 
Real time collection remains limited 
- Improved UAV capability 
- 7 P-3 Orion aircraft (some located at 
Gwadar Naval Base 
- Enhanced AWACs 
Strategic 
- Nuclear triad complete with one 
operational SSBN (Arihant) 
- Increased long-range strategic 
capability focused on IRBMs and 
ICBMs. 
- Indigenous BMD point defense 
capability (additional satellites 
and 6 interceptor batteries, 3 each 
in New Delhi and Mumbai) 
- Significant increases in plutonium-
based fissile material production 
- Centralized C2 of nuclear forces 
- Improved integration of conventional 
and nuclear forces  
- Added SRBMs 
- Operational Hatf-9 (Nasr) batteries 
integrated into Pakistan Army 
mobilization 
- Increased Hatf-8 Ra’ad (ALCM) and 
Hatf-7 Babur (LACM) 
- Added Hatf-10 (SLCM) 
Figures are 2020 estimates and were derived from various open studies, including IHS Jane’s, IISS The Military 
Balance: 2013, and other open sources.
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Appendix B: National Command Authority (NCA) 
Guidance 
 India Pakistan 
Purpose Punish Pakistan’s 
military/government apparatus for 
the cumulative negative effects felt 
by India from terrorist attacks 
emanating from Pakistan and 
compel Pakistan to relinquish use of 
proxies as an instrument of policy. 
Punish India for the cumulative negative 
effects of India’s ISR “blinding” 
campaign and to deter such action in the 
future. 
Method Employ diplomatic, information, military, and economic elements of national 
power in a decisive, coordinated and supporting fashion. 
Endstate Pakistan has relinquished use of 
proxies as an element of national 
policy by taking significant, visible 
and measurable steps towards 
eradicating their military, 
intelligence and government 
organizations of this cancer. 
India sees that acts of armed aggression 
against the Pakistani state will not go 
unpunished and is deterred from future 
acts of provocation. 
Planning 
Factors 
-­‐ Strategic deterrence must 
remain credible -­‐ Stay below the Pakistani 
nuclear employment threshold -­‐ PK provocations will no longer 
go unanswered -­‐ Military Response must: be 
swift and punitive; minimize 
civilian casualties to the 
greatest extent possible; seek 
no permanent change to IB 
and/or LoC -­‐ Maintain balance with China 
to deter opportunism -­‐ Minimize disruption to global 
maritime commerce 
 
-­‐ Strategic deterrence must be 
credible -­‐ Stay below the Indian nuclear 
threshold -­‐ Indian provocation cannot go 
militarily unanswered -­‐ Military Response must: be swift 
(initiate within 72 hours) and 
punitive, but avoid triggering all-
out conventional war; minimize 
civilian casualties to the greatest 
extent possible; seek no permanent 
change to IB and/or LoC -­‐ Maintain balance with Afghanistan 
to deter opportunism 
  





1. Punish and force Pakistan to 
relinquish use of proxies 
2. Portray PK as the instigator, 
and ensure India is viewed as 
the aggrieved party 
3. Deter PK from undertaking 
future provocative peacetime 
military actions and violating 
India’s territorial integrity 
4. Deter PK ground 
counterattack into IN 
territory 
5. Terminate campaign on 
India’s terms once other 
strategic objectives are 
accomplished 
1. Punish and raise the cost on India 
for its “blinding” campaign; 
compel India to cease its efforts 
to degrade Pakistani ISR 
2. Portray India as the instigator, 
and ensure Pakistan is viewed as 
the aggrieved party 
3. Deter IN from undertaking future 
provocative and dangerous 
peacetime military actions 
4. Deter and respond to any IN 
ground counterattacks on PK 
territory; prevent any seizure of 
PK territory 
5. Terminate campaign once other 
strategic objectives are 
accomplished on terms favorable 
to Pakistan 
Additional NCA Guidance for Move 3 
Specific 
Guidance 
Your recommendation to initiate 
cross-IB operations has been taken 







Given that we did not seek an all-out 
war but instead sought to punish 
Pakistan for their actions, for your 
planning purposes, your NCA is 
considering an operational pause to 
de-escalate the crisis.  
1. What is your recommendation 
for an appropriate level of 
punishment before we direct 
an operational pause?  
2. Determine what additional 
actions are necessary to reach 
your recommended level of 
punishment. 
Develop a plan (move #3) that will bring 
about a cessation of hostilities while 
protecting Pakistan’s sovereignty, 
territorial integrity, and strategic assets. 
Note: The Pakistan Team answered the 
new NCA guidance explicitly with a two 
part plan: 
Part 1: defend – Pakistan is taking 
necessary measures to defend itself. 
Part 2: achieve war termination -­‐ Launch offensive to force Indian 
military out of Pakistan to defend 
Indian territory. -­‐ Achieve tactical gains (capture 
territory) for later bargaining.  
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Given Pakistan’s ground offensive 
operations into Indian territory, the 
NCA does not think that now is the 
time for an operational pause. The 
NCA is reluctant to allow cross-
border operations but is willing to 
entertain your recommendation as to 
how a cross-border operation would 
contribute to meeting our strategic 
objectives. 
Develop a plan (move #4) that will bring 
about a cessation of hostilities while 
protecting Pakistan’s sovereignty, 





SO4: Deter Defeat PK ground 
counterattack into IN territory 
SO1: Punish and raise the cost on India 
for its “blinding” campaign; compel 
India to cease its efforts to degrade 
Pakistani ISR 
 
